There will be some among you who will wonder as to my qualifications to speak before this distinguished medical body. May I say that this involves diagnostic problems for me as well. A disturbingly candid friend whom I encountered in London the night before last offered one solution: 'Perhaps they heard,' she said, 'that you are one of the world's medically more interesting cases of hypochondria.' She may be right, but it could be paranoia. There is also the possibility that you wanted me to speak on economicsa terrible subject, even worse than clinical psychiatry. And that, indeed, is what I propose to do.
My lecture this evening involves a critique of what has long been known to economists as neoclassical economics and to other people as economics. It is a line of criticism with which I have for some time been associated. It involves problems that bear, I believe, more than marginally on your professional as well as personal existence. In bringing together a number of strands of this criticism this evening I am covering ground that I have trod beforemost notably, perhaps, a year or so back in a series of lectures at the University of Cambridge. The one thing worse than to fail in originality is to imagine it. In professional matters we all cherish our own view of thingsand restate it with increasing admiration. To my other reasons for being grateful to you there is yet another to be added. That is for being a completely fresh and virgin audience. But let me get on with my subject.
Conventional or neoclassical economics has, as its major building block, the theory of the business firm. Its view of the firm, with one major exception, is homogeneous. Some firms are large; many are small; but all are subject to the same motivation and confined by the same discipline. All develop alike. The motivation is that of profit maximization; the discipline is that of the market; the combination of the two ensures that all will be subject to the ultimate instruction of the consumer. The pursuit of profit requires that it respond to the instruction of the consumer as to where profit can be made. The discipline of the market leaves it no choice. Thisthe full subordination of the system to the consumer or public purposeis, in turn, its prime moral and political justification.
The exception to the generally homogeneous theory of the firm is the case of monopoly or oligopoly. But the monopolist or oligopolist also maximizes returns; he does this by responding to the instruction of the consumer. Resource use is less than ideal; income distribution departs from the competitive norm. But the consumer remains in control.
In these last years I have been seeking to develop a view of the modern industrial economy which abandons this assumption of homogeneity for something more usefully akin to reality. This view divides the modem economy into two parts: that of the few large firms which I call the planning system, and that of the many small firms which I call the market system. What separates the two parts is the susceptibility of the given task to being performed by an organization. The singular feature of the firms in the planning system is complex organization. The feature distinguishing the market system is the continuing need for a dominant role by a single individual or entrepreneur. I believe this new view of the modem economy gives a much better insight into the way it functionsand the way it fails to functionthan the more traditional theory. There is a tendency for scholars so to favour their own thoughts. My purpose is first to give an outline of this bimodal theory of the modern economic system. Then I shall proceed to what it explainswith particular reference to its relation to development and to the associated effect on income. I shall also notice some other consequences.
(II)
The two systems into which, for the purpose of analysis, I divide the modern industrial economy are, in their contribution to total output in developed economies, about equal in size. What I have termed the market system consists, in the United States, of between ten and twelve million small firmsservice establishments, small retailers, handicraft and small manufacturing establishments, artists, lawyers, physicians and the like. The planning system consists of the thousand great corporationsthe economy of General Motors, Ford, General Electric, IBM, General Dynamics. Or, in Britain, Imperial Chemicals, BP or Unilever. There is a broad similarity in this relationship between advanced industrial countries.
The market system consists, to repeat, of firms performing those economic tasks that do not lend themselves to accomplishment by organization. A variety of factors can exclude or make uneconomical the use of organization in economic life. Four are of special importance as follows:
(1) Organization is difficult if the activity is geographically dispersed and unstandardized as to task. Such is the case with much agriculture, most repair services, much retailing. Because of geographical dispersion supervision of the working force is difficult. Because tasks are unstandardized, it is difficult to set performance norms. So the individual is able to set his own pacewhich is normally slow. He markedly increases the energy, both mental and physical, that he puts into the job if he is subject to the incentive system of the independent entrepreneur -if he gets the rewards of his own diligence and intelligence and, what may be more important, if he suffers personally for their absence. All of this is to say that the entrepreneurial firm has advantages over more organized effort.
(2) Organization is difficult and frequently impossible when the service depends for its value on the interaction ofpersonalitywhen, in the purest sense of the term, it is a personal service. A lawyer, physician, psychiatrist, priest, personal servant or prostitute sells some aspect of hisor herpersonality or person. For such a transaction an organization has, very often, no advantage or may be irrelevant.
(3) Organization is invariably difficult where the service or product has major artistic content. The artist, unlike the scientist or engineer, does not work well as a member of a team. He does not share his art with others; he must be in command of the whole artistic conception. This is recognized in everyday language. The man who fits badly into an organizationcorporation, university faculty, public bodyis usually described as being 'altogether too much of an artist'.
(4) Organization is at a disadvantage in the very considerable number of cases where the individual exploits himself or his family or an immediate employee. In organization, men work a specified time, at a specified rate, for specified pay. The individual entrepreneurthe small commercial farmer for examplecan work himself and his family as hard and as long as he wishes and for as little pay as he wishes. Thus he survives in competition with organization.
For these four reasonsgeographical dispersion of unstandardized tasks, essential interaction of personality, artistic constraints, self-exploitationorganization cannot function successfully. The firm remains identified with individual personality and thus remains small. Being small, it is, generally speaking, without power. It is subject to movements in prices and costs in an externally determined demand function in the manner of the classically competitive enterprise. It remains subordinate to the market. Thus the survival of the market system in the modern industrial economy. I turn now to what I have called the planning system.
(III)
The planning system consists of the large manufacturing, transport, power, utility, communications and merchandising firms. These firms are highly organized; this is their central feature. Not only do their tasks lend themselves well to organizationthe mass deployment of workersbut there is organization as well for management or command. In the management, no individual can possess more than a fraction of the information that is required for important decisions. So, when fully developed, the firm is guided collegially by a complex organization for sharing and using the information of numerous individuals. This guiding organizationsenior executives, subordinate executives, scientists, engineers, plant managers, sales managers, marketing specialists, advertising managers, controllers, lawyers -I have called, with some acceptance, the technostructure. In this firm, power passes to those who have and share information. Those who do not have information are excluded; if they do intrude, being uninformed, they endanger the quality of the decision. Such exclusion is the fate of the nonparticipating owner or shareholder. Not being involved in the collegial process, he cannot influence its decisions, and he is a threat to the enterprise if he tries. (The dispersion of stock ownership in the modem corporation together with the well-established habit of giving proxies to the management further reduces stockholder power.) So, in the large, fully mature corporation -General Motors, General Electric, Shell, BPthe power of the technostructure, so long as the firm is making a reasonable minimum of earnings, is plenary. This is not easily conceded. The nominal representatives of the owners sitting on the board of directors will often have the illusion of power. They ratify with appropriate ceremony decisions that have already been taken. They speak with the solemnity that is always induced by association with large sums of money. They are treated with the deference properly accorded to age or incipient senility. Their practical power is not negligible but nil. In the smaller of the great corporations, power may still remain with the stockholder or owner although this ordinarily requires active participation in the management. But in all cases in all countries the tendency is the same. As the corporation matures, power passes from the owner of the capital to the technostructure.
The point is an essential one. In the ultimate evolution of the industrial enterprise power does not come to rest with the capitalist. It comes to reside with organizationwith the industrial bureaucrat. Many people have an interest in keeping the power of the capitalist alive. The economist needs the entrepreneur as the profitmaximizing pivot of his system. Without him much painfully acquired knowledge becomes obsoleteas do all the texts. The modern radical needs the capitalist as an enemy. The modem manager needs him as the cover for his personal power. When the manager does something offensive to public attitudes or morality, he needs to explain that he is merely the servant of his stockholders. To challenge such a formidable opposition may be quixotic. But the point is vital. At the higher stages of development power passes and passes irrevocably from the capitalist to the industrial bureaucrat.
Power having passed to the technostructure, the latter uses it to advance its own interests. On this pointthat self-interest is still pursued in economic life -I am wholly orthodox. And the firm being large and powerful, this power is in keeping. In the market system profit maximization remains the basic motivation; no other is consistent with survival. In the mature corporation this ceases to be so. It is undoubtedly true that the technostructure has as its first interest the need for a minimum or threshold level of earnings. This keeps the shareholders quiet and ensures its autonomy and thus its power. Both proxy battles and takeovers threaten companies that are doing badly or less well than they might. But beyond a certain level of earnings the pecuniary interest of the technostructure is served, categorically, by the greatest possible growth. Earnings accrue to the stockholders to whom the technostructure is no longer beholden. The benefits of growth, in contrast, accrue directly to the technostructure. Growth increases the responsibility and thus the salaries and perquisites of the members of the technostructure. And growth enlarges opportunity for promotion and therewith also income. The larger the firm, the more power that is exercised collegially by the technostructure. Power is a source of prestige, and it also makes more effective the pursuit of the goal of further growth. I do not suggest that growth is the only goal of the technostructure. Having a technical orientation it may, within narrow limits, make technical innovation a goal in itself. This is an index of success. And although it does not maximize earnings, the ability to increase earnings from one year to the next is also an important index of success. But, given the necessary minimum of earnings, growth is the dominant motivation. A healthy rate of growth, as it is significantly called, is the basic index of success.
(IV)
I come now to the reasons why I have designated this part of the economy the planning system. The firm in the market system responds passively to the message of the market; the firm in this part of the system is active in pursuit of its goals. It has monopolistic (or oligopolistic) power over its prices, similarly over its major costs. It can alter the position or shape of its demand functionand this explains the vast deployment of resources and talent in modern advertising, merchandising and salesmanship. And it shapes public attitudes and the policy of the state in accordance with its needs. This last deserves a special word.
The members of the technostructure comprise the most affluent, reputable and substantial element in the national community. They are, in the common phrase, the Establishment. What is deemed to be sound national policy is what reflects their needs. What is considered sound responsible economics is what serves or legitimatizes their goals. What the technostructure wants or needs is approved as sensible by the reputable press and politicians. The goals of the technostructure and the planning system tend, accordingly, to become the goals of the state. The technostructure, as I have just noted, values growth. This is much in its interest. And for this reason, or largely for this reason, economic growth has become a prime goal of the modern state.
The technostructure has more specific advantages in its relation to the modern state. The public bureaucracy, not the legislature, is increasingly the locus of public power. The corporate bureaucracy has great advantages in dealing with the public bureaucracy; there is, indeed, a relationship of reciprocal advantage between the two. In the United States the large weapons firm persuades the Air Force to want the products it can supply. The Air Force, in turn, persuades the firm to supply what it wants. This interbureaucratic symbiosis is a unique feature of the planning system at its highest level of development.
But even in the absence of this symbiotic relationship there is access. The individual farmer or merchant from the market system cannot sit down with the public bureaucracy and work things out to mutual advantage. His resort, individually or collectively, must be to the legislature. The doors of the bureaucracy are always open to the large corporation. The president of General Motors has a prescriptive right to see the President of the United States. The president of General Electric has a similar right to see the Secretary of Defense. The president of General Dynamics can always see a general. Only an organization can deal effectively with another organization.
We see that the firm in the planning system exercises power in its own rightpower, as stated, over prices, costs and the consumer. It also exercises power that it derives from the state. When power is so exercisedby human agency as distinct from the marketwe properly speak of planning and thus of this part of the economy as the planning system.
(V)
The distinction just developedthe two parts of the modern economy, each operating under its own dynamicbrings, I suggest, the central problems of the modern economic system into focus. Let me now turn to what is so revealed. It affirms that problems of everday notice and complaint are not momentary aberrations in an otherwise satisfactory system. It shows them to be systemic, to be deeply inherent in the structure of the system.
Thus the modern economy is criticized for being unequal or irrational in its performance: it produces too many automobiles, too many cigarettes, too many roads, too few houses, too few doctors, too little mass transportation. This is the most pervasive criticism. We now see how this is possibleperhaps inevitable. Where the technostructure is powerful, highly developed and highly persuasive, there is predictably a strong development. Where the technostructure is undeveloped, where its capacity to persuade is slight, there is less development. This difference in performance is unrelated to consumer preference. It cannot be explained by the oldest of the neoclassical devices for escaping thought: 'Yes, it is insane, but it is what the consumer wants.' The difference in development is related to the different power of different technostructures or to the total lack of such power in the market system. The industries that are symbols of deprivationhousing, health services, mass transportationhave very poorly developed technostructures or are in the market system. This is the cause of relative underdevelopment. (Agriculture would also be a problem industry had we not, especially in the English-speaking countries, developed a substitute system of technology and market controls under public auspices.) One hears also that modern governments, again most notably that of the United States, have got their priorities wrong. Public, as distinct from all, resources are irrationally distributed. Too much public money is spent on weapons, industrial research and development, supersonic transport, space exploration, highway and airport development, technical education. Urgent and elementary public needs, as for welfare, sanitation, health care, ordinary education, police, law courts, the arts and the like, are starved. We see that this is not a random error. The planning system is powerful in the state. Public services that supply its needs are amply provided. The market system and the citizen are less powerful or without power. Their needsare less amply provided or are starved.
Next it is observed that even in the richest of modern economieshere I make special reference to the United Statespeople continue to live a precarious existence. They do not share in the general affluence. Inequality, if anything, increases. This, too, the present analysis makes predictable. The planning system has a strong technical dynamic based on high technical competence and strong state support. The market system, with the exception of commercial agriculture, lacks such support. The firm in the planning system has control with varying effectiveness over prices, costs and its demand function. The firm in the market system has no such control. In the planning system effective rules govern wages and hours and intensity of work. In the market system some firms survive because they can reduce their wage (or that of others) and increase hours of work. The neoclassical assumption of a tendency to equalization of factor return that of labour and entrepreneurial income in particularis without foundation. Perhaps it would not be unjust to call it a frauda cloak for a different and important reality. The true tendency is for incomes in the two parts to diverge. And the greater power of the planning system to set prices and costs means, pari passu, that it can set prices and costs for the market system to which it is juxtaposed. In important degree the planning system is able to exploit the market system. This is perhaps less possible in Britain thanks to more extensive union organization in the market sector.
I am persuaded that more is explained by a bimodal view of the modern industrial economy than the matters here identified. Environmental problems are explained in part by the independent thrust of the planning system for growth. Some of the international competitive problems of American industry are to be explained by the way this system, at its highest development, distributes capitalhow, in particular, it concentrates it on such internationally noncompetitive industries as weaponry and space travel and forces much civilian industry to make do with old plant. The endemic tendency of the modern economy to inflation is explained. It begins in the planning system with the countervailing development there of unions. It proceeds from the power of the planning system then to resolve differences with the unions by exporting the costs to the rest of society. In recent times both Mr Heath and Mr Nixon have been strongly committed to the market system in principle, if Mr Nixon will forgive that term. Both have had to surrender in practice to the realities of the planning system and fix wages and prices. The complaint that modern industry is bureaucratic and unresponsive to public will isconsidering its massive organization and pursuit of goals that are not those of the public but of its own bureaucracynot surprising. But these matters are beyond the scope of this paper. Instead let me conclude with a word on the lines of practical thought and action to which these ideas lead. (VI) It is implicit, though never quite explicit, in neoclassical attitudes that, as the modern economy grows and develops, it also perfects itself. That assumption must be firmly rejected. The greater the development of the economy, the more unequal its performance in relation to public need. That is because producer power, not public preference, is a determining factor in that development. Those who teach the old neoclassical doctrine must know they are serving not the truth but, from the viewpoint of the planning system, a convenient disguise of the truth. It is, however, an increasingly less efficacious disguise. For, while neoclassical economics can conceal the possibility of unequal growth, it cannot conceal the practical problems of such growth.
The present view of the economy leads to a new view of social action and of socialism. The socialist has always been attracted, instinctively, to the positions of power in the economy. That is where he expects to find exploitation. But exploitation in the classical sense is not now the problem. Once growthand pricing for growthbecome the goal of the technostructure, oldfashioned monopolistic exploitation ceases to be an issue. And, in fact, in the positions of power in the modern economy neither workers nor consumers are abused. It is the weaknesses in the economy that are the problem in practice. For, in fact, it is with housing, hospitals, health care, urban transportation, urban services and agriculture that modern social action has been greatly concerned. The weakness of these industriesthe absence of a developed technostructurehas already forced the pace of social action. Modern socialism does not seek the commanding heightsexcept in its rhetoric. It must, as a practical matter, concentrate first on the abysmal swamps.
The problem of the overdeveloped technostructure must, none the less, be a subject of profound public concern. We must recognize that we get weapons, automobiles, highways, space travel, in their present abundance not because we want or need them but because the planning system has the power to obtain them. The foregoing must be urgently in mind in the allocation of public resources. The problem of the modern legislature is to allocate resources in accordance with the public need as opposed to the power of the planning system. Iflegislatures respond to the planning system, they will (as now) reinforce the positions of abundance in the economy. Only if they resist 563, Proc. roy. Soc. Med. Volume 66June 1973 technocratic need and respond to the differing public need will they effectively enhance economic and public well-being. In the United States a new look at military expenditures is especially indicated. These, in the past, were imagined to serve the public interest and strategic need. The imagination can no lbnger be so stretched to cover the present arms budget. It reflects, in fact, bureaucratic symbiosis and the power of the planning system at its highest level of development.
Much stronger measures to correct economic inequality are also called for than in the past. The tendency is not to reduction of inequality; it is to increasing disparity as between the industrial and the market systems. This has obvious bearing on redistributive tax policy. But more is involved. Public measures for the protection of prices and wages in the market system are essential. So are steps to establish a minimum guaranteed incometo provide, in effect, a floor under incomes in the market system. It is not surprising that this ideaunthinkable a few years agoshould now be by way of becoming a central issue in the current political discussion. Circumstance has an admirable way of forcing the pace even where the ideas are reluctant.
(VII)
In the years following World War II, when the goals of the technostructure were accepted without question as the goals of society and when, in particular, economic growth seemed to be the solution for all public ills, economists came imperceptibly but very definitely to the conclusion that most of the problems of their subject matter had been solved. Mathematical refinement of existing models was now the need. The age of major structural reform was over. The concept of a bimodal economyand the principal consequence which is the unequal development of product and incomeshows how wrong this estimate was. It leaves us with the happy conclusion that in economics the age of thought is not yet completely over.
